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USING THE PUBLIC NUISANCE DOCTRINE
TO COMBAT ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE
AMANDA PURCELL*
Antibiotics are vital for modern medicine. Without them, people could die from
mere scratches that become infected, and important medical procedures such as
caesarean sections, cancer treatments, hip replacements, and organ transplants
would not be feasible. Unfortunately, though, bacteria are becoming increasingly
more resistant to antibiotics, posing one of the most serious health threats in the
United States and abroad. In fact, a single strain of bacteria, methicillin-resistant
S. aureus (MRSA), kills more Americans annually “than emphysema,
HIV/AIDS, Parkinson’s disease, and homicide combined.” The subtherapeutic
use of antibiotics in agricultural settings contributes to the rise of antibiotic
resistance, while not providing enough benefits to outweigh the harms. Despite
this, the U.S. government has failed to adequately address antibiotic misuse.
The public nuisance doctrine provides a novel strategy for combating the
improper use of antibiotics in livestock. A public nuisance is based on an
unreasonable interference with a right common to the public, which has
traditionally included public health. Improper subtherapeutic antibiotic use is
a threat to public health because it increases the risk and incidence of antibioticresistant infections and threatens continued availability of effective antibiotics.
Unlike in the past, the relationship between subtherapeutic antibiotic use and
increased antimicrobial resistance is now undeniable, and viable alternatives
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exist for producers to keep their livestock healthy. Although some have bemoaned the
public nuisance doctrine as an “impenetrable jungle” and a “wilderness of law,” it
is capable of “adapt[ing] to changing scientific and factual circumstances” and
providing an alternative avenue for protecting the public.
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INTRODUCTION
“Most evolving lineages, human or otherwise, when threatened
with extinction, don’t do anything special to avoid it.”
—George C. Williams, evolutionary biologist1
Obscured by a barrage of meticulously reported modern horrors—
the specter of nuclear war, climate change, cyberterrorism, etc.—
unglamorous threats such as antimicrobial resistance (AMR)2 brew
quietly and menacingly in the background. For example, whereas even
highly insulated Americans were terrified by the Ebola outbreak of 2014,
far fewer appreciate the local and ongoing public health threat of AMR.3
Yet, unknown to most, Ebola claimed 11,310 lives worldwide from 2014
to 2016, with only one death in the United States,4 while AMR is
responsible for 23,000 deaths in the United States each year.5 Globally,
700,000 people die annually of resistant infections, and this figure is
expected to balloon to ten million deaths annually by 2050, costing $100
trillion in economic output.6

1. Frans Roes, A Conversation with George C. Williams, 107 NAT. HIST. 10, 10 (Feb. 1998).
2. The term antimicrobials encompasses antibacterials (commonly known as antibiotics),
antivirals, antiprotazoals, and antifungals, all of which should be used judiciously. See
Pharmacology, UNIV. MINN.: ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE LEARNING SITE, https://amrls.umn.
edu/antimicrobial-resistance-learning-site/pharmacology (last visited Oct. 17, 2018).
3. An October 2014 Pew Research Center survey found that ninety-eight
percent of those polled had heard at least a little about the Ebola virus with fortynine percent tracking news about Ebola “very closely,” and forty-one percent worried
they would be exposed to the virus. Ebola Worries Rise, but Most Are ‘Fairly’ Confident
in Government, Hospitals to Deal with Disease, PEW RES. CTR.: U.S. POL. & POL’Y (Oct.
21, 2014), http://www.people-press.org/2014/10/21/ebola-worries-rise-but-mostare-fairly-confid ent-in-government-hospitals-to-deal-with-disease. In comparison, a
2012 report found that forty-one percent of those polled had heard “just some or
nothing about” AMR, and participants “were apt to consider the resistance problem
to be a lower-tier one—it did not rise to the importance of issues such as cancer,
obesity, or heart disease.” Hart Research Associates and Public Opinion Strategies,
Americans’ Knowledge of and Attitudes Toward Antibiotic Resistance 5, 7 (2012),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/phg/content_level_pag
es/in_the_news/abxpollsummarypdf.pdf.
4. 2014–2016 Ebola Outbreak in West Africa, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/
ebola/history/2014-2016-outbreak (last visited Oct. 17, 2018).
5. See CDC, ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE THREATS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2013 6 (2013),
https://www.cdc.gov/drugresistance/pdf/ar-threats-2013-508.pdf.
6. THE REVIEW ON ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE, TACKLING DRUG-RESISTANT
INFECTIONS GLOBALLY: FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1 (2016), https://amrreview.org/sites/default/files/160525_Final%20paper_with%20cover.pdf.
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More troubling still, AMR is difficult to combat because it emerges from
many sources, each of which might alone be insignificant, but which
combined create a serious public health threat.7 Antimicrobials are
ubiquitous—they are administered by various methods, for various
purposes, in various settings. As a result, AMR is the type of problem that
humans are notoriously ill-equipped to address—chronically germinating,
causally complex, enormous in scale, and temporally distant.8
While the natural response to an overwhelming threat is inaction,
the more productive response is to target the manageable elements of
the complex issue. In that spirit, this Comment will address a
particularized, but important, source of AMR in the United States: the
improper use of antibiotics in livestock. For decades, antibiotic use in
livestock has gone relatively unchecked by regulators and legislators,
yet it continues to endanger Americans by fostering resistant bacteria
that infect humans and other animals, while also threatening the
continued availability of antibiotics to the public.9
Since the 1950s, antibiotics have been administered to livestock at
subtherapeutic levels, meaning at levels too low for an antibiotic to act
as a therapy for a disease.10 At subtherapeutic levels, antibiotics are
used not just to treat disease, but also sometimes in the absence of any
disease for purposes like increasing animal growth and preventing

7. See id. at 10 (explaining that increased use of antibiotics causes antimicrobial
resistance to develop more quickly than it would naturally); Rajesh R. Uchil et al.,
Strategies to Combat Antimicrobial Resistance, 8 J. CLINICAL & DIAGNOSTIC RES. 1, 3 (July
2014) (recommending that antimicrobial resistance be combatted through multiple
channels because the widespread use of antibiotics in many settings contributes to the
accelerated development of antimicrobial resistance).
8. See Andy Murdock, Why Humans Are so Bad at Thinking About Climate Change,
VOX (Apr. 19, 2017, 9:10 AM), https://www.vox.com/videos/2017/4/19/15346442/
humans-climate-change-psychology (discussing how temporal and spatial distance of
problems and feelings of hopelessness make it difficult for humans to care about issues
like climate change and highlighting the need to make climate change more
“personal”); see also Humans Wired to Respond to Short-Term Problems, NPR (July 3, 2006,
2:15 PM), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5530483 (“[T]he
human brain evolved to respond to immediate threats but may completely miss more
gradual warning signs.”).
9. See Beth Gardiner, Taking on the Superbugs, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/20/business/energy-environment/taking-onthe-superbugs-antibiotics.html; Giorgia Guglielmi, Are Antibiotics Turning Livestock into
Superbug Factories?, SCIENCEMAG (Sept. 28, 2017), http://www.sciencemag.org/news/
2017/09/are-antibiotics-turning-livestock-superbug-factories.
10. See 21 C.F.R. § 558.15(a) (2016); Bonnie M. Marshall & Stuart B. Levy, Food Animals and
Antimicrobials: Impacts on Human Health, 24 CLINICAL MICROBIOLOGY REVS. 718, 718 (2011).
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disease.11 In 2011, the Natural Resources Defense Council, the Center
for Science in the Public Interest, Public Citizen, and the Union of
Concerned Scientists filed a complaint to compel the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) to withdraw approval for subtherapeutic uses in
animal feed of two important antibiotics.12 Unfortunately, the plaintiffs
were ultimately unsuccessful, amounting to yet another failed attempt
to address antibiotic misuse.13 These persistent failures to satisfactorily
address antibiotic misuse signal the need for a novel legal approach for
curtailing improper antibiotic use in livestock that does not rely on the
FDA or the legislatures.
This Comment proposes that, given the inadequacy of regulatory
and legislative solutions, public nuisance lawsuits provide an
alternative means for combatting improper antibiotic use in livestock
as an unreasonable interference with public health, despite potential
state-law impediments to nuisance lawsuits. Part I will discuss how the
use of antibiotics in livestock increases AMR for both humans and
other animals.14 Part II will provide an overview of the public nuisance
doctrine’s historical and modern applications, in addition to
elucidating the elements required for a public nuisance claim.15 Part II
will also discuss state right-to-farm laws, which sometimes pose barriers

11. Id.
12. See Compl. for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2, Nat. Res. Def. Council,
Inc. v. FDA, 760 F.3d 151 (2d Cir. 2014) (No. 11 CV 3562) (basing their requested
order compelling the FDA to withdraw approval for two antibiotics on an FDA finding
in 1977 that the antibiotics were unsafe for use in animal feeds because they “were
contributing to the development of antibiotic-resistant bacteria that could be
transferred to humans,” which the agency never pursued further).
13. See Nat. Res. Def. Council, 760 F.3d at 175 (concluding that the FDA had
discretion to terminate a hearing process that could lead to withdrawing approval for
the antibiotics). See generally Sidney A. Shapiro, Overuse of Antibiotics in Concentrated
Animal Feeding Operations: Regulation and Tort Law, 47 ENVTL L. 557 (2017) (discussing
“the potential role of the tort system to plug the regulatory gap created by the
reluctance of the Food and Drug Administration . . . to reduce the use of antibiotics
in animal food production”); Christine Donovan, Note, If FDA Does Not Regulate Food,
Who Will? A Study of Hormones and Antibiotics in Meat Production, 41 AM. J.L. & MED. 459,
467–71, 475–77 (2015) (discussing the agencies involved in regulating food safety and
the under-regulation of antibiotics as a result of industry influence over Congress and the
FDA); Sarah R. Haag, Note, FDA Industry Guidance Targeting Antibiotics Used in Livestock Will
Not Result in Judicious Use or Reduction in Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria, 26 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.
REV. 313, 321–24 (2015) (discussing the various agencies involved in regulating antibiotics
and failed attempts over the last forty years to reduce use of antibiotics in livestock).
14. See infra Part I.
15. See infra Part II.
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to nuisance claims.16 Part III will argue that both private and public
plaintiffs can use public nuisance claims to curb the improper use of
antibiotics, despite right-to-farm laws, and that improper antibiotic use
is a much more suitable target for the public nuisance doctrine than
many of its other modern applications.17
I. SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND
In concert with other public health improvements, antibiotics have
extended the average American’s life expectancy from 56.4 years in
1920 to 80 years as of 2005, through control or eradication of bacterial
infections.18 Unfortunately, bacterial resistance has invariably emerged
alongside the development and use of each antibiotic, rendering them
less effective.19 Use of antibiotics in livestock for disease treatment,
control, and prevention as well as for growth promotion contributes
significantly to antibiotic resistance, with negative implications for
human health.20 Despite scientists’ concern over antibiotic use in
livestock since the mid-1950s, various U.S. government actors have failed
to adequately address antibiotic misuse in agricultural settings.21
A. The Importance of Antibiotics
Antibiotics are vital to modern medicine, but society has forgotten
the extent of their importance. Americans most often use antibiotics
to cure common, typically non-life-threatening maladies like strep
throat, bronchitis, sexually transmitted diseases, and ear, sinus, and
urinary tract infections.22 Thus, it is hardly surprising that most do not
appreciate, or even realize, that antibiotics have transformed the
specter of death historically accompanying these maladies into the

16. See infra Part II.
17. See infra Part III.
18. C. Lee Ventola, The Antibiotic Resistance Crisis Part 1: Causes and Threats, 40
PHARMACY & THERAPEUTICS 277, 278 (2015).
19. See id. at 277–78 (providing a timeline of the introduction of new antibiotics
and the years in which antibiotic resistance to those same drugs was first identified).
20. See Marshall & Levy, supra note 10, at 729.
21. See Sabrina R. Rearick, Comment, Eliminating Antibiotic Use in Animal Production:
Responding to Scientific Evidence of an Impending Global Health Crisis, 54 DUQ. L. REV. 537, 544–
45, 547, 549, 557 (2016) (detailing failed federal legislation, imperfect executive efforts
under President Obama, and unrelenting FDA intransigence beginning in the 1960s).
22. See Michael A. Steinman et al., Changing Use of Antibiotics in Community-Based
Outpatient Practice, 1991–1999, 138 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 525, 528 (2003) (analyzing
trends in antibiotic use for common infections).
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specter of an annoying days- to weeks-long pill regimen.23 Beyond
treating infections, antibiotics are integral to medical procedures now
taken for granted, such as caesarean sections, cancer treatments, hip
replacements, and organ and tissue transplants.24 If society is left without
effective antibiotics, even minor infections and surgeries will again be
deadly.25 After all, the first man treated with penicillin ultimately
succumbed to a horrendous Staphylococcus (S.) and Streptococcus infection
once the scientists’ supply of penicillin ran out; his infection had been
caused by a mere scratch from working in his rose garden.26
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) considers
antibiotic resistance one of the most serious health threats in the United
States, especially since it is steadily growing.27 Multidrug resistance is
especially concerning because it signals the demise of effective
antibiotics.28 Ominously, in August 2016, the CDC reported the death
of the first American with an infection resistant to all twenty-six antibiotics
available in the United States.29 Per 2013 estimates, at least two million
Americans acquire serious infections from antibiotic-resistant bacteria
23. Pharyngitis (Strep Throat), CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/groupastrep/diseaseshcp/strep-throat.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2018) (explaining that antibiotic treatment
drastically shortens the duration of strep throat and reduces the probability of
spreading viruses and bacteria to others).
24. See Press Association, Antibiotic Resistance Could Spell End of Modern Medicine, Says
Chief Medic, GUARDIAN (Oct. 13, 2017, 3:41 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/soc
iety/2017/oct/13/antibiotic-resistance-could-spell-end-of-modern-medicine-says-chie
f-medic (reporting on a warning from the chief medical officer of England of a “postantibiotic apocalypse”).
25. See News Release, World Health Org., The World Is Running Out of
Antibiotics, WHO Report Confirms (Sept. 20, 2017), http://www.who.int/newsroom/detail/20-09-2017-the-world-is-running-out-of-antibiotics-who-report-confirms
(warning that “[a]ntimicrobial resistance is a global health emergency that will
seriously jeopardize progress in modern medicine”).
26. Howard Markel, The Real Story Behind Penicillin, PBS NEWS HOUR (Sept. 27,
2013, 2:06 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/health/the-real-story-behind-theworlds-first-antibiotic.
27. See CDC, supra note 5, at 5. See generally ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE GLOBAL
REPORT ON SURVEILLANCE, WHO (2014), http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/
10665/112642/9789241564748_eng.pdf (reporting on AMR resistance in different
regions of the world and in specific pathogens); NATIONAL ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE
MONITORING SYSTEM (NARMS) 2014 HUMAN ISOLATES SURVEILLANCE REPORT, CDC
(2014), https://www.cdc.gov/narms/pdf/2014-Annual-Report-narms-508c.pdf (reporting
changes in AMR resistance in the United States by pathogen and antimicrobial).
28. CDC, supra note 5, at 5.
29. Lei Chen et al., Notes from the Field: Pan-Resistant New Delhi Metallo-BetaLactamase-Producing Klebsiella pneumoniae—Washoe County, Nevada, 2016, CDC (Jan. 13,
2017), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/66/wr/mm6601a7.htm.

346

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:339

annually, and at least 23,000 die from their infections.30 A single strain
of bacteria, methicillin-resistant S. aureus (MRSA), kills more Americans
annually “than emphysema, HIV/AIDS, Parkinson’s disease, and
homicide combined.”31 An additional 14,000 people die annually from
Clostridium difficile (C. diff.) infections, many preventable, which develop
in part from antibiotic use.32 The annual national cost associated with
antibiotic resistance is estimated to be $55 billion, with $20 billion in
direct costs and $35 billion from lost productivity.33
B. The Use of Antibiotics in Farm Animals
Eighty percent of antibiotic sales in the United States are of
antibiotics bought for use in animal agriculture.34 Antibiotics are
administered to livestock for disease treatment, control, and
prevention, and, until recently, for growth promotion.35 To cut costs,
many producers house livestock in cramped, unsanitary, and stressful
conditions, incidentally allowing pathogens to transfer easily, and
making each animal “a ‘factory’ for the propagation of multidrug
resistance . . . including resistance against drugs that were never used
on the farm.”36 In order to sustain deleterious conditions, producers
stave off disease by using livestock feed laced with small,
subtherapeutic amounts of antibiotics.37

30. CDC, supra note 5, at 6.
31. Zhabiz Golkar et al., Bacteriophage Therapy: A Potential Solution for the Antibiotic
Resistance Crisis, 8 J. INFECTION DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 129, 130 (2014).
32. CDC, supra note 5, at 11.
33. Id.
34. Joan A. Casey et al., High-Density Livestock Operations, Crop Field Application of
Manure, and Risk of Community-Associated Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus
Infection in Pennsylvania, 173 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1980, 1981 (2013).
35. Marshall & Levy, supra note 10, at 718. Producers began using antibiotics for
growth promotion in the 1950s upon discovering that adding small amounts of antibiotics
to animal feed enhanced weight gain. Id. Only since 2017 has the use of antibiotics for
growth promotion been prohibited. See infra note 48 and accompanying text.
36. See id. at 719; Ellen K. Silbergeld et al., Industrial Food Animal Production,
Antimicrobial Resistance, and Human Health, 29 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 151, 153 (2008).
37. See Ryan Gunderson, Meat and Inequality: Environmental Health Consequences of
Livestock Agribusiness, in POL. ECOLOGIES OF MEAT 101, 104 (Jody Emel & Harvey Neo
eds., 2015) (“The massive amount of veterinary pharmaceuticals used in intensive
livestock production is to keep food animals ‘healthy’ in the extremely crowded and
filthy conditions where they grow . . . .”); see also Timothy F. Landers et al., A Review of
Antibiotic Use in Food Animals: Perspective, Policy, and Potential, 127 PUB. HEALTH REP. 4,
6 (2012) (providing an example of therapeutic versus subtherapeutic use: “16% of all
lactating dairy cows in the U.S. receive antibiotic therapy for clinical mastitis each year,
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Scientists have found that subtherapeutic antibiotic use propagates
AMR, including multidrug resistance.38 Subtherapeutic use entails
continuously exposing bacteria to sub-lethal levels of antibiotics, which
is “particularly effective” in increasing AMR.39 To some extent, the
development of AMR is evolutionarily inevitable, but constant use of
antibiotics accelerates the process by killing susceptible bacteria until
eventually only resistant bacteria remain, and also by increasing
horizontal transfer of resistance genes from bacterium to bacterium.40
Horizontal transfer occurs when bacteria that have developed
resistance to a certain antibiotic, or to several antibiotics, transfer their
resistance genes to other bacteria that have never been exposed to the
antibiotic.41 Resistant bacteria can be transferred from animals to
humans via direct contact with the animals, transmission through the
food chain, or environmental transfer (e.g., transfer by water or by
manure).42 Indeed, a recent study found that multidrug-resistant S.
aureus contaminated thirty-seven to seventy-seven percent of meat
samples from grocery stores, with fifty-two percent of the bacterial
strains drug-resistant.43
Subtherapeutic antibiotic use is unreasonable because many
alternatives to antibiotics for preventing disease exist. By employing
better animal husbandry practices, for instance, “equivalent
improvements in growth and feed consumption can be achieved by
improved hygiene.”44 Denmark, for example, successfully banned all
subtherapeutic use of antibiotics in pigs by 1999 with little negative effect
but nearly all dairy cows receive intra-mammary infusions of prophylactic doses of
antibiotics following each lactation to prevent and control future mastitis”).
38. Marshall & Levy, supra note 10, at 719.
39. See Silbergeld, supra note 36, at 155 (noting that subtherapeutic use “driv[es]
the selection of resistant strains, and under conditions of continued antimicrobial
pressure, resistant strains are advantaged in terms of reproduction and spread”).
40. See id. at 155–56 (listing the main scientific principles of AMR).
41. See Qiuzhi Chang et al., Antibiotics in Agriculture and the Risk to Human Health:
How Worried Should We Be?, 8 EVOLUTIONARY APPLICATIONS 240, 243 (2015) (explaining
horizontal transfer of resistance genes in greater detail).
42. See Marshall & Levy, supra note 10, at 723, 725, 729 (explaining that resistant
bacteria spreads through contact with animals, animal products, or animal environments).
43. Andrew E. Waters et al., Multidrug-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus in U.S. Meat
and Poultry, 52 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1227, 1229 (2011).
44. Silbergeld, supra note 36, at 162 (explaining that crowding animals increases
stress, which weakens their immune systems, and increases incidence of injuries); see
also Heather K. Allen et al., Finding Alternatives to Antibiotics, 1323 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD.
SCI. 91, 91–93 (2014) (discussing additional alternatives to antibiotics, including
probiotics and prebiotics).
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on the pork industry and with a significant decrease in resistant
microbes in animals and meat.45 More significantly, there are already
profitable livestock operations in the United States that have stopped
using antibiotics at subtherapeutic levels.46
C. U.S. Government Action on Antibiotic Misuse
In January 2017, the FDA finally forbade the use of medically
important antimicrobials47 in farm animals for growth promotion and,
in addition, required that farmers obtain authorization from a
veterinarian for other uses of medically important antimicrobials.48
While this might seem promising, the Expert Commission on
Addressing the Contribution of Livestock to the Antibiotic Resistance
Crisis found the measure insufficient.49 Most troublingly, subtherapeutic
use for disease prevention remains a viable practice, especially since
prescribing veterinarians are often employed by large meat production
companies.50 In addition, growth promotion use constituted only ten to
fifteen percent of overall antibiotic use in animals, and many of the
antibiotics previously labeled for growth are also labeled for disease
prevention—meaning a farmer could continue to use the same antibiotics

45. Sharon Levy, Reduced Antibiotic Use in Livestock: How Denmark Tackled Resistance,
122 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. A160, A162 (2014).
46. PEW CHARITABLE TR., ANTIBIOTIC-FREE FOOD ANIMAL PRODUCTION:
A
PROFITABLE PATH FROM THE FARM TO THE TABLE 1–2 (2010) http://www.pewtrusts.org/
~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/phg/content_level_pages/issue_briefs/hhifibantibio
ticfreeproductionpdf.pdf.
47. The FDA uses medically important antimicrobials to mean “antimicrobial drugs that
are important for therapeutic use in humans.” FDA, Guidance for Industry #209: The
Judicious Use of Medically Important Antimicrobial Drugs in Food-Producing Animals 3
(2012), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/AnimalVeterinary/GuidanceComplianceEnfor
cement/GuidanceforIndustry/UCM216936.pdf.
48. News Release, FDA, FDA Announces Implementation of GFI #213, Outlines
Continuing Efforts to Address Antimicrobial Resistance (January 3, 2017); see also Lisa
Heinzerling, The FDA’s Continuing Incapacity on Livestock Antibiotics, 33 STAN. ENVTL. L.J.
325, 327, 329 (2014) (discussing the FDA’s history of inaction and impotence
regarding antibiotics); Christine Donovan, Note, If FDA Does Not Regulate Food, Who
Will? A Study of Hormones and Antibiotics in Meat Production, 41 AM. J.L. & MED. 459, 470–
71, 475–76 (2015) (discussing the role of industry resistance in the FDA’s and the
United States Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) failure to regulate antibiotics, as
well as comparing U.S. regulation to European regulation).
49. EXPERT COMM’N ON ADDRESSING THE CONTRIBUTION OF LIVESTOCK TO THE
ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE CRISIS, COMBATING ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE 16 (2017), http://
battlesuperbugs.com/sites/battlesuperbugs.com/files/Final%20Report%208.25.17.pdf.
50. See id. at 16–17.
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for growth promotion but claim it was for disease prevention.51 Federal
legislative measures to further restrict agricultural antibiotic use have
failed, although two states, California and Maryland, have passed more
stringent laws that not only prohibit administration of antibiotics for
growth promotion, but also curb long-term administration of antibiotics
for disease prevention.52 Overall though, given the inadequate regulation
of antibiotic use, public health proponents ought to consider novel
approaches, such as public nuisance lawsuits.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Public nuisance is an old, amorphous common law doctrine with two
basic forms. The first form, like private nuisance, arises when a property
owner uses his land in a way that interferes with another’s right to enjoy
her property; if the interference affects a large enough number of
people, what would otherwise be a private nuisance is promoted to the
status of public nuisance.53 The second, more widely accepted form
stems from an “unreasonable interference with a right common to the
general public.”54 Historically, public nuisance actions were brought
to remedy the social ills of pre-industrial and industrializing society,
including problems like obstructed public highways or waterways and
threats to public health.55 More recently, parties have attempted to use

51. Id. at 16.
52. See CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE §§ 14400–08 (West 2015); MD. CODE ANN., AGRIC.
§§ 3-1001–06 (West 2017); Press Release, Congresswoman Louise M. Slaughter, Rep.
Slaughter, Only Microbiologist in Congress, Introduces Legislation to Save Antibiotics
(Mar. 15, 2017) (noting that Congresswoman Slaughter was a cosponsor of the original
Preservation of Antibiotics for Medical Treatment Act of 1999 and reintroduced the
bill during each of her last four terms in office).
53. See, e.g., Clark v. London & Lancashire Indem. Co. of Am., 124 N.W.2d 29, 33–
34 (Wis. 1963) (referring to a public nuisance action in which 194 nearby residents
sued the defendant for poor management of a dump, which attracted many rats and
flies and caused noxious hydrogen sulfide gas to permeate the neighborhood). But see
Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 780 A.2d 98, 131–32 (Conn. 2001) (“Nuisances are
public where they violate public rights, and produce a common injury, and where they
constitute an obstruction to public rights . . . . The test is not the number of persons
annoyed, but the possibility of annoyance to the public by the invasion of its rights.”
(quoting Higgins v. Conn. Light & Power Co., 30 A.2d 388, 391 (1943))); infra note 61
(discussing the evolution of the public nuisance theory).
54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
55. See, e.g., Carver v. San Pedro, L.A. & S.L.R. Co., 151 F. 334, 334–35 (C.C.S.D.
Cal. 1906) (holding that the defendants’ bridge created a public nuisance because it
obstructed navigation of a waterway); Seigle v. Bromley, 124 P. 191, 193, 195 (Colo.
App. 1912) (finding that a hog farmer’s practice of feeding garbage to his pigs was a
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public nuisance actions to remedy modern social ills like lead paint,
asbestos, guns, genetically modified rice, trans-fats, and opioids.56
Because the public nuisance doctrine developed interwoven with the
state’s police power, a plaintiff may be able to establish causation at a
population level rather than at the more onerous individual level.57 A
private citizen who asserts a public nuisance claim, however, must
establish special harm to have standing, which often necessitates
something like proof of causation at the individual level.58 In general,
courts are more likely to require private citizens to prove elements
transposed from private nuisance, a tort action.59 Because nuisance
actions historically had been so successful, all fifty state legislatures
have passed right-to-farm laws, limiting nuisance actions against farms

public nuisance because it threatened public health by promoting infectious disease); Eble
v. State ex rel. Leavenworth Cty. Att’y, 93 P. 803, 804 (Kan. 1908) (concluding that the
defendant’s fence was a public nuisance because it obstructed a public highway); Mills v.
Hall & Richards, 9 Wend. 315, 315–17 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1832) (determining that overflow
created by the defendants’ dam was a public nuisance because it fostered malaria).
56. See, e.g., County of Falls v. Purdue Pharma, LP, No. 6:18-cv-47-RP-JCM, 2018 WL
1518849, at *1, *4 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2018) (remanding to state court a case in which
Falls County brought a public nuisance claim against pharmaceutical companies that
distributed or manufactured opioids); New Hampshire v. Purdue Pharma, No. 17-cv-427PB, 2018 WL 333824, at *1, *4 (D.N.H. Jan. 9, 2018) (remanding to state court a case in
which the state of New Hampshire brought a public nuisance claim against a
pharmaceutical company that sold and marketed opioids); Guttmann v. Nissin Foods
(U.S.A.) Co., No. C 15-00567 WHA, 2015 WL 4309427, at *5–6 (N.D. Cal. July 15, 2015)
(rejecting an argument that artificial trans fats are a public nuisance); In re Genetically
Modified Rice Litig., 666 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1018 (E.D. Mo. 2009) (holding that
genetically modified rice was not a public nuisance); Corp. of Mercer Univ. v. Nat’l
Gypsum Co., No. 85-126-3-MAC, 1986 WL 12447, at *1, *5–7 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 9, 1986)
(refusing to hold an asbestos manufacturer responsible in a public nuisance action); In
re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d 484, 505 (N.J. 2007) (rejecting an argument that
defendants’ production and distribution of lead paint was a public nuisance); City of
Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099, 1147–48 (Ill. 2004) (rejecting a public
nuisance claim against a gun manufacturer).
57. See Lindsay F. Wiley, Rethinking the New Public Health, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
207, 231 n.95, 237, 266 (2012) (explaining that establishing causation at an individual
level requires showing that an identifiable plaintiff’s injury is traceable to an
identifiable defendant’s action or inaction); see also infra Section II.B.2.c (explaining
that state actors must prove an unreasonable interference with a public right and the
interference is caused or maintained by defendants).
58. See infra Section II.B.2.c (asserting that plaintiffs required to prove special harm may
find it difficult to prove that a certain source caused a harm that accumulated over time).
59. See Karol Boudreaux & Bruce Yandle, Public Bads and Public Nuisance: Common Law
Remedies for Environmental Decline, 14 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 55, 62–63 (2002) (claiming that private
citizens bringing public nuisance cases must base liability on the defendant’s negligence).
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and farm activities; nevertheless, most of these laws do not preclude
nuisance actions concerning public health.60
A. Source of the Public Nuisance Doctrine
The nebulous legal theory of public nuisance arose in English common
law.61 In a public nuisance action, the King, through his attorney general,
could enjoin any action that infringed on rights common to the public.62
Unsurprisingly, U.S. common law imported public nuisance theory,
substituting individual states in the King’s place as protectors of the
public.63 In the United States, public nuisance cases have fallen into the
general categories of interference with use of a public thoroughfare,
public health, public safety, public morals, or public comfort.
Many have recognized that society’s need to constrain negative
externalities underlies the doctrine of public nuisance.64 In explaining
the doctrine’s history, one court opined, “[T]he community’s right to
security and protection must be reconciled with the individual’s right to
expressive and associative freedom . . . . By entering society, individuals
give up the unrestrained right to act as they think fit; in return, each has
a positive right to society’s protection.”65 Similarly, another court
described the court’s power to issue injunctions to abate public
nuisances as based on the “obligations which [government] is under to
60. See infra notes 156–162 and accompanying text (discussing right-to-farm laws).
61. See Victor E. Schwartz & Phil Goldberg, The Law of Public Nuisance: Maintaining
Rational Boundaries on a Rational Tort, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 541, 543 (2006) (explaining
the origin and evolution of public nuisance theory in England).
62. Id.
63. See Nw. Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659, 667 (1878) (“We cannot
doubt that the police power of the State was applicable and adequate to give an
effectual remedy [to the nuisance] . . . . It rests upon the fundamental principle that
every one [sic] shall so use his own as not to wrong and injure another. To regulate
and abate nuisances is one of its ordinary functions.”).
64. See Lisa Grow Sun & Brigham Daniels, Externality Entrepreneurism, 50 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 321, 348 (2016) (“Judge Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed, in a landmark
article, recognized early that the goal of internalizing externalities is a major driver of
nuisance law. Indeed . . . one might define nuisance in terms of the externalities
suffered by property owners and by the public more generally . . . . While externality
entrepreneurism permeates nuisance law, its role is clearest when we examine cases in
which courts must confront whether new activities or evolving technologies alter what
counts as a nuisance.”); Wiley, supra note 57, at 265–67 (“[T]he plaintiff [in a public
nuisance action] may be able to establish that the defendant’s actions have contributed
to unhealthy living conditions . . . . This concept of public bads as indivisible negative
externalities is intimately linked to the economic concept of public goods that has
played a prominent role in public health law and public nuisance law.”).
65. People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 603 (Cal. 1997).
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promote the interest of all, and to prevent the wrongdoing of one
resulting in injury to the general welfare,” i.e., an obligation to
internalize negative externalities.66 For this reason, a “‘nuisance’ is a
term for all practices, avocations, erections, establishments, etc., against
which courts will give relief, although they are not intrinsically criminal,
because of their tendency to create annoyance, ill health, or inconvenience.”67
B. Bringing a Public Nuisance Claim
Most states have adopted statutes that provide criminal penalties for
public nuisances, but many statutes either do not define public
nuisance whatsoever or offer only a vague definition.68 Nonetheless,
courts have presumed that these statutes include interferences with
public rights that historically constituted common-law public
nuisances.69 In addition, courts have explicitly acknowledged that new
types of harms can be recognized as public nuisances.70
The Second Restatement of Torts defines public nuisance as “an
unreasonable interference with a right common to the general
public.”71 Although nuisance law differs from state to state, a plaintiff
will generally have to establish (1) a right common to the public, (2) an
unreasonable interference with that common right, and (3) proximate
causation.72 In addition, a private citizen who seeks to bring a public
nuisance claim must first establish standing by alleging a special
harm.73 A government actor, on the other hand, is not required to
establish that it has suffered a special harm.74

66. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 584 (1895)).
67. Kilts v. Bd. of Supervisors, 127 N.W. 821, 823 (Mich. 1910) (emphasis added)
(citations omitted).
68. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. c. (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
69. Id.
70. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099, 1120–21 (Ill.
2004) (“[P]ublic nuisance statute does not displace common law actions; common law
right to action to abate public nuisance exists independently of any statutory right.”
(citing Gilmore v. Stanmar, Inc., 633 N.E.2d 985, 993 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994))).
71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B.
72. See infra Section II.B.2.a.
73. See infra Section II.B.2.b.
74. See infra Section II.B.2.c.
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1. Standing
A state’s attorney general can bring a public nuisance claim on
behalf of the state as parens patriae.75 As long as the state is protecting
a sovereign or semi-sovereign interest, like the health or welfare of its
citizens or the economy of the state, it need not establish that it
suffered a special injury.76 Early parens patriae public nuisance lawsuits
permitted states to address industrial problems of the twentieth
century like air and water pollution.77 By the middle of the century,
these lawsuits extended to the new issues of price-fixing and market
manipulation and to injuries to the state’s economy.78 Most recently,
state attorneys general and municipalities have attempted to
“address[] public health crises such as global warming, lead paint,
handguns, tobacco, environmental pollution, and climate change” via
public nuisance lawsuits.79
Especially when involving consumer products, a parens patriae lawsuit
can allege damages to the state itself, given that the state ultimately
assumes the financial responsibility for injuries sustained by its citizens

75. The Latin phrase parens patriae means “parent of the country.” See Parens
Patriae, THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989). In addition to a state’s
attorney general, the representative of a political subdivision of a state may also have
standing to bring a public nuisance action on behalf of the public. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C(2).
76. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C; Thomas H. Koenig & Michael L.
Rustad, Reconceptualizing the BP Oil Spill as Parens Patriae Products Liability, 49 HOUS. L.
REV. 291, 313–14 (2012) (noting that the state cannot merely be litigating its citizens’
personal claims). Some courts, however, have held that a public plaintiff either may seek
only abatement of a nuisance or may seek damages only upon proving that the public
entity had suffered some type of special injury, just as a private plaintiff would have to.
See, e.g., Louisiana v. Rowan Co., 728 F. Supp. 2d 896, 905 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (holding that
to recover damages, a plaintiff must prove a “significant harm different in kind from that
suffered by the general public,” and that the State’s assertion of harmful pollution
“fail[ed] to establish that it suffered significant harm different in kind from the general
public”); In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d 484, 502 (N.J. 2007) (finding that the city could
“only proceed in the manner of private plaintiffs,” thus requiring the city to identify a
special injury, because, instead of abatement, the city sought money damages, which fell
“outside the scope of remedies available to a public entity plaintiff”).
77. See Margaret S. Thomas, Parens Patriae and the States’ Historic Police Power, 69
SMU L. REV. 759, 791 (2016) (discussing how the parens patriae power of England’s
sovereign has morphed into the states’ public guardianship powers under the “quasisovereignty theory”).
78. See id. at 791–92.
79. See Koenig & Rustad, supra note 76, at 305–07 (explaining that parens patriae
public nuisance lawsuits have become popular for cities and states “to achieve collective
solutions for mass injuries in the absence of effective action from the legislative branch”).
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from the product or practice at issue.80 Nonetheless, simply because a
state has expended money to pay for its citizens’ injuries does not
suffice for the city to have a legitimate parens patriae public nuisance
lawsuit.81 Consistent with this principle, many state courts have ruled
that “a state or municipality does not have standing to sue as parens
patriae against a product manufacturer, because the damages sustained
by the government are ‘derivative’ or ‘too remote.’”82 Instead, the state
must be able to articulate a quasi-sovereign interest apart from the
interests of its citizens.83 According to the Supreme Court in Alfred L.
Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel., Barez,84 “a [s]tate has a quasisovereign interest in the health and well-being—both physical and
economic—of its residents in general.”85 Notably, a mere increased
risk of future injury can satisfy standing requirements as long as the
risk of harm rises above mere conjecture.86
If a private citizen, on the other hand, wishes to bring a public
nuisance lawsuit, the person must prove she has suffered “harm of a
kind different from that suffered by other members of the public
exercising” the common right.87 Many of the novel public nuisance
actions have been brought by private citizens, including cases
80. See GIFFORD, infra note 134, at 123 (providing, as an example, Rhode Island’s
lawsuit to recover, from lead pigment manufacturers, the costs of educating its residents
about the dangers of lead); see also Wiley, supra note 57, at 212 (“If a state or city government
bringing suit in parens patriae successfully establishes interference with a public right, the
door is opened to flexible doctrines of causation and fault that make liability more likely.”).
81. GIFFORD, infra note 134, at 125.
82. Id.; see also Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 538 (2007) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) (“[P]arens patriae actions raise an additional hurdle for a state litigant: the
articulation of a ‘quasi-sovereign interest’ ‘apart from the interests of particular private
parties.’” (quoting Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S.
592, 607 (1982))); GIFFORD, infra note 134, at 135–36 (providing the example of Ganim
v. Smith & Wesson Corp., in which the Connecticut Supreme Court held a city lacked
standing to bring a lawsuit against gun manufacturers because the city’s harms of
increased police costs from illegal use of guns were too remote from the
manufacturers’ conduct of simply manufacturing guns).
83. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc., 458 U.S. at 607; see also id. at 602 (defining quasisovereign interests as “a set of interests that the State has in the well-being of its populace”).
84. 458 U.S. 592 (1982).
85. See id. at 607.
86. See Baur v. Veneman, 352 F.3d 625, 634 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting that “the
potential harm from exposure to dangerous food products or drugs ‘is by nature
probabilistic,’ yet an unreasonable exposure to risk may itself cause cognizable injury”
sufficient to satisfy the standing requirements (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.
Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 160 (4th Cir. 2000))).
87. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
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addressing pollution, guns, and crops.88 Alas, it is not uncommon for
courts to find that the harm suffered by a plaintiff is not unique
enough to warrant standing.89
One type of harm that will typically qualify as a “kind different from
that suffered by other members of the public” is physical harm suffered
by the plaintiff.90 However, the plaintiff must prove that a “detrimental
effect to [her] health . . . actually has occurred or is reasonably certain
to occur due to a present harm.” 91
Some courts have exhibited fairly low standards for harm of a different
kind; for example, in Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc.,92 residents and owners
of Mississippi coastal land brought a public nuisance claim against energy,
fossil fuel, and chemical companies.93 The plaintiffs argued that the
companies had “caused the emission of greenhouse gasses,” contributing
to global warming, which then altered sea levels and thus “added to the
ferocity of Hurricane Katrina.”94 The court held that the plaintiffs had
satisfied their standing requirement because the hurricane had destroyed
their private property and public property that they used.95

88. See, e.g., infra note 198 and accompanying text.
89. See, e.g., NAACP v. AcuSport, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 2d 435, 446–47, 455, 499 (E.D.N.Y.
2003) (finding that the plaintiffs, even though they suffered great risk from illegal handguns
in the market, did not meet the standing requirement because they did not demonstrate that
their injury was “different in kind” and greater than the harm experienced by all others in the
state); Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 780 A.2d 98, 108–10, 117–18 (Conn. 2001) (holding
that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring a lawsuit against gun manufacturers because the
claimed harms of high levels of violent crime, suicides, and homicides; reduced property
value and economic productivity; and detrimental effect on the public welfare, were too
remote from the manufacturers’ conduct).
90. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C(1); see also City of Evansville v.
Rinehart, 233 N.E.2d 495, 497 (Ind. Ct. App. 1968) (upholding a public nuisance
judgment in favor of the plaintiff, who sustained a badly infected cut from falling into
a natural ditch where germ-laden effluent from a city-maintained sewage tank
drained); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C(2) cmt. d. (requiring a private
citizen to have suffered harm of a kind different from the harm to the general public).
91. See Rhodes v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 636 F.3d 88, 95 (4th Cir. 2011) (finding
that the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the injury requirement with their argument that they were
injured because PFOA (a chemical) accumulated in their blood, significantly increasing their
risk of developing certain diseases as compared to the general population’s risk).
92. 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009), reh’g granted, 598 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
93. Id. at 859.
94. See id. (connecting in turn the ferocity of Hurricane Katrina to the property
damage of the plaintiff’s private property and useful public property).
95. See id. at 859, 863, 867 (finding the standing requirement satisfied by the
plaintiffs’ allegations of property damage in addition to their claim that the
defendants’ emissions “unreasonably interfered with a common right of the general
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2. Elements of public nuisance
a. A right common to the public
A public nuisance interferes with a right “common to all members
of the general public[,] . . . collective in nature and not like the
individual right that everyone has not to be assaulted . . . or negligently
injured.”96 Accordingly, one court has approved of the description of
a public right as one involving “an indivisible resource shared by the
public at large, like air, water, or public rights-of-way.”97
A public nuisance need not affect an entire community, “so long as
the nuisance will interfere with those who come in contact with it in
the exercise of a public right or [if] it otherwise affects the interests of
the community at large.”98 However, a danger to a single person may
alone constitute a public nuisance; for example, “the threat of
communication of smallpox to a single person may be enough to
constitute a public nuisance because of the possibility of an epidemic.”99
Many public nuisance claims throughout the years have been
premised upon unreasonable interferences with public health, which

public by causing the loss of use and enjoyment of public property through erosion of
beaches, rising sea levels, saltwater intrusion, habitat destruction, and storm damage”).
96. In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d 484, 497 (N.J. 2007) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 1979)) (“Thus the pollution of a
stream that merely deprives fifty or a hundred lower riparian owners of the use of the
water for purposes connected with their land does not for that reason alone become a
public nuisance. If, however, the pollution prevents the use of a public bathing beach
or kills the fish in a navigable stream and so deprives all members of the community
of the right to fish, it becomes a public nuisance.”).
97. See City of Chicago v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 823 N.E.2d 126, 131–33 (Ill. App. Ct.
2005) (noting the defendants’ persuasive arguments that the plaintiff city did not
successfully “allege that the presence of paint containing lead pigment harms
individuals in the exercise of their public rights” because the city’s claim “implicate[d]
an assortment of claimed private individual rights that do not belong to the public at
large because the alleged conditions exist within private homes, which the general
public has no right to enter, and therefore do not interfere with any ‘public right,’”
but ultimately passing on public right issues).
98. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. g.
99. Id.; see also Ajamian v. Twp. of N. Bergen, 246 A.2d 521, 526 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1968), aff’d, 257 A.2d 726 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1969) (per curiam)
(holding that a single filthy, vermin-infested building was a public nuisance because
the “building was clearly detrimental to the health and safety of its occupants and to
anyone who would come in contact with it, or might be within the area of exposure to
its unsanitary condition”).
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is a right common to the general public.100 In a Colorado case from
1912, Seigle v. Bromley,101 the court held that a hog farmer’s practice of
feeding garbage to his pigs—including “rotten meat, offal from
slaughterhouses, and stuff from hospitals, rags and poultices”—
constituted a public nuisance.102 The court noted that diseases like
typhus, typhoid fever, scarlet fever, and malaria could be contracted
from the garbage and carried from the farm by house flies.103 Thus,
the court reasoned that the potential danger of contagious disease
amounted to an unreasonable interference with public health.104 Seigle
also serves as a good example of a nuisance that did not actively affect
the entire community, but did threaten “the interests of the entire
community” because of the possibility of disease generation and
transmission.105 Similarly, in Durand v. Dyson,106 the court said that cattle
with a dangerous, contagious disease are a public nuisance and that
“[p]revention of the spreading of dangerous diseases among cattle is
now universally recognized in this country as within the domain of the
police power, as it is so essential to the public safety and health.”107
100. See, e.g., Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 136 (1894) (“[The police power] is
universally conceded to include everything essential to the public safety, health, and
morals, and to justify the destruction or abatement, by summary proceedings, of
whatever may be regarded as a public nuisance. Under this power . . . the [s]tate may
order . . . the slaughter of diseased cattle; the destruction of decayed or unwholesome
food; . . . the compulsory vaccination of children; the confinement of the insane or
those afflicted with contagious diseases . . . .”); Town of Nags Head v. Toloczko, No.
2:11-CV-1-D, 2014 WL 4219516, at *16 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 18, 2014) (“Whatever tends to
endanger life, or generate disease, and affects the health of the community . . . is
generally, at common law, a public nuisance, and a crime.”(quoting State v. Everhardt,
166 S.E. 738, 741–42 (N.C. 1932))).
101. 124 P. 191 (Colo. App. 1912).
102. See id. at 193–94 (finding the hog farmer’s practices “so repulsive and so
inimical to the public health as to prompt the inquiry as to how, in a civilized
community, such things are permitted to exist, and why the offenders are not both
restrained and criminally prosecuted”).
103. Id. at 193.
104. Id. at 193, 195; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(1) (AM. LAW
INST. 1979).
105. See Seigle, 124 P. at 193; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. g.
106. 111 N.E. 143 (Ill. 1915).
107. Id. at 145; see also State ex rel. Lamm v. City of Sedalia, 241 S.W. 656, 657 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1922) (holding that a city created a public nuisance by leaving animal
carcasses unburied for days at the designated burial site because the malodorous
atmosphere there was “injurious and uncomfortable” to people traveling nearby and
to people living and farming nearby, and because the practice furthered disease, given
that dogs fed upon animals killed by infectious diseases and “blood and obnoxious
matters” spread into underground streams, polluting the water).
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Examples of cases involving non-infectious-disease interferences
with public health also abound.108 For example, in New York v. Shore
Realty Corp.,109 the State of New York sued a realty company under, inter
alia, New York public nuisance law to abate a hazardous waste disposal
site.110 The company had acquired the land knowing that hazardous
waste had been stored on the site without government approval, yet
the company did not attempt to clean up the site.111 The court held
that the site constituted a public nuisance since the court had “no
doubt that the release or threat of release of hazardous waste into the
environment unreasonably infringes upon a public right.”112
Specifically, public health was endangered by toxic, carcinogenic
substances held in tanks on the property that were dangerous if
touched, inhaled, or ingested.113
More recently, plaintiffs attempting to protect public health have
brought public nuisance actions against manufacturers of products—
though not without drawing criticism from scholars and skepticism
from courts.114 Actions against gun manufacturers and distributors
have been some of the most successful cases employing public
nuisance theory. For example, in Ileto v. Glock, Inc.,115 shooting victims
and their family members argued that the defendants’ intentional
creation of an illegal secondary gun market via their distribution
scheme constituted an unreasonable interference with public health
and safety.116 The court agreed, finding the interference substantial,
unreasonable, and “definitely offensive.”117 Likewise, in NAACP v.
AcuSport, Inc.,118 the plaintiffs argued that the defendants caused an
unreasonable interference with the public health through “imprudent
sales and distribution practices throughout the United States; and . . .

108. See, e.g., State ex rel. Marron v. Compere, 103 P.2d 273, 275, 277–79 (N.M. 1940)
(holding that a man’s unlicensed practice of medicine was a public nuisance because
the man endangered public health by prescribing drugs and treating physical and
mental ailments without any skill, training, or moral or professional qualifications).
109. 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
110. Id. at 1037.
111. Id. at 1037, 1051.
112. See id. at 1051 (noting that proof of a threatened harm from the nuisance sufficed
for the State to obtain abatement—the State did not need to have proved actual harm).
113. Id. at 1038.
114. See, e.g., infra notes 122–125 and accompanying text.
115. 349 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2003).
116. Id. at 1195, 1198, 1211.
117. Id. at 1211.
118. 271 F. Supp. 2d 435 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
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negligently and intentionally fail[ing] to take practicable marketing
steps that would have avoided or alleviated the nuisance.”119
b. An unreasonable interference
Not all suggested interferences with public health have been
successful, though, because “not every interference with collective
social interests constitutes a public nuisance . . . . [T]he interference
must be both substantial and unreasonable.”120 Perhaps recognizing that
the term unreasonable is rather vague, the Second Restatement of Torts
provides the following guidance:
(2) Circumstances that may sustain a holding that an interference
with a public right is unreasonable include the following:
(a) Whether the conduct involves a significant interference with
the public health, the public safety, the public peace, the public
comfort or the public convenience, or
(b) whether the conduct is proscribed by a statute, ordinance or
administrative regulation, or
(c) whether the conduct is of a continuing nature or has produced
a permanent or long-lasting effect, and, as the actor knows or has
reason to know, has a significant effect upon the public right.121

Even with the Second Restatement’s elaboration, what constitutes a
“significant” interference with the public health seems largely left to a
court’s discretion. For example, in the California case Guttmann v.
Nissin Foods (U.S.A.) Co.,122 a man sought to eradicate artificial trans-fat
in Nissin Food’s instant noodle products.123 The plaintiff cited studies
linking trans-fat consumption with increased risk of medical
conditions like heart disease, diabetes, cancer, etc. and alleged that
there was “‘no safe level’ of artificial trans[-]fat[s]” in support of his
public nuisance claim.124 The court dismissed his claim, commenting
that “[n]o decision applying California law has found that interference
with the general public’s right to a safe food supply by selling products
with unhealthy ingredients constituted a public nuisance.”125 As
119. See id. at 446–47, 455, 499 (ruling ultimately, however, that plaintiffs could not
succeed on their public nuisance claim because they did not meet the standing requirement).
120. People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 604 (Cal. 1997).
121. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821B (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
122. No. C 15-00567 WHA, 2015 WL 4309427 (N.D. Cal. July 15, 2015).
123. Id. at *1.
124. Id. at *1, *5.
125. Id. at *5–6; see also Red v. Gen. Mills, Inc., No. 2:15-CV-02232-ODW(JPR), 2015
WL 9484398, at *1, *5–6 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2015) (holding that the defendants’ use of
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another example, a federal district court rejected a claim in 2009 that
genetically modified rice constituted an interference with a public
right because the plaintiffs did not present evidence sufficient to raise
a question of danger to public health and safety.126
c.

Proximate causation

Plaintiffs find public nuisance actions particularly attractive because
they might not have to establish proximate causation as precisely as in
other tort actions. This is because, “[a]t least in theory, public
nuisance plaintiffs, who are alleging harm to the public at large rather
than to any particular individual or class of individuals, need only
prove causation at the population level.”127 Thus, state actors typically
must prove simply that an unreasonable interference with a public
right exists and that “the defendants caused or are maintaining the
condition constituting the nuisance.”128
For example, in In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MBTE) Products
Liability Litigation,129 New York City sued Exxon and fifty-four other
petroleum companies upon finding that a chemical, MBTE, had
contaminated groundwater because of underground tanks spilling and
leaking gasoline.130 MBTE can render water undrinkable and is a
known non-human animal carcinogen and a suspected human
carcinogen.131 Although Exxon argued that its supplying gasoline was
“too remote” from a particular contaminated aquifer, the court upheld
the jury’s verdict holding Exxon responsible for having created a

partially hydrogenated oils in their products did not qualify as an interference with a
public right).
126. In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., 666 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1018 (E.D. Mo. 2009).
127. See Wiley, supra note 57, at 237 (footnotes omitted); see also NAACP v. AcuSport,
Inc. 271 F. Supp. 2d 435, 497 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (“[W]here the welfare and safety of an
entire community is at stake, the cause need not be so proximate as in individual
negligence cases.”).
128. See New Mexico v. General Elec. Co., 335 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1258–59 (D.N.M. 2004);
City of Seattle v. Monsanto Co., 237 F. Supp. 3d 1096, 1107 (W.D. Wash. 2017) (“Monsanto
urges the Court to find that other PCB producers caused the contamination of Seattle's
water, and/or that the intervening acts of third parties . . . cut off proximate causation. The
Court is not persuaded. Monsanto does not argue that it is responsible for none of the
PCBs in Seattle's water; the existence of other PCB sources merely creates a question of fact
regarding the amount of damages for which Monsanto is responsible.”).
129. 725 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2013).
130. See id. at 78, 82 (commenting that all companies except for Exxon settled before trial).
131. Id. at 92.
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public nuisance.132 The court explained that, under state law, “[e]very
one who creates a nuisance or participates in the creation or
maintenance thereof is liable for it.”133
Because the cause of action is no different between private and
public plaintiffs, private plaintiffs likewise must establish the presence
of an unreasonable interference with a public right and that the
defendants caused or maintained the interference. Unfortunately,
however, the private plaintiff’s need to establish special harm for
standing will often negate the potentially less stringent standard of
proof for proximate causation in a public nuisance action. Namely, to
establish standing, some private plaintiffs may face the difficult task of
proving that a specific source caused a particular harm that
accumulated somehow over a long period of time.134
Further, private nuisance has corroded public nuisance, so that
courts increasingly have required private plaintiffs especially to prove
elements, such as specific proximate causation and control, that
historically were unnecessary for successful public nuisance cases.135 In
fact, many of the recent attempts to apply the public nuisance doctrine

132. See id. at 82, 120 (noting also that Exxon allegedly knew that station owners
would store gasoline in leaky underground tanks and knew that MBTE spreads quickly
once released into groundwater).
133. See id. at 121 (alteration in original) (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. Singer
Warehouse & Trucking Corp., 447 N.Y.S. 265, 267 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982)).
134. See DONALD G. GIFFORD, SUING THE TOBACCO AND LEAD PIGMENT INDUSTRIES:
GOVERNMENT LITIGATION AS PUBLIC HEALTH PRESCRIPTION 121–22 (2010) (noting that
statutes of limitations and assumption of the risk theories are also barriers to successful
individual tort claims).
135. See Whaley v. Park City Mun. Corp., 190 P.3d 1, 6 (Utah Ct. App. 2008) (stating
that private plaintiffs in public nuisance lawsuits “must establish additional elements
beyond those required to be proven by a public entity,” including that the defendants
“caused or are responsible for the nuisance”). Section 821B, comment e of the Second
Restatement of Torts explains how these additional requirements came to be, stating:
The common law criminal offense of public nuisance involved an interference
with a right common to the general public. Little more than this in the way of a
standard for determining what kinds of interferences constitute the crime of
public nuisance was to be found in the cases. But as the tort action came into
the picture, the use of the single word “nuisance” to describe both the public
and the private nuisance, led to the application in public nuisance cases . . . of
an analysis substantially similar to that employed for the tort action for private
nuisance. . . . Thus, by analogy . . . the defendant is held liable for a public
nuisance if his interference with the public right was intentional or was
unintentional and otherwise actionable under the principles controlling liability
for negligent or reckless conduct or for abnormally dangerous activities.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
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to novel issues have been thwarted by courts requiring plaintiffs to
prove that the defendants were in control of the nuisance.136 For
instance, litigation of lead paint as a public nuisance has been largely
unsuccessful because of the problem of control. In In re Lead Paint
Litigation,137 local governments tried to sue manufacturers and
distributors of lead paint to recover the costs of detecting and
removing lead paint from homes and buildings, providing medical
care to residents affected by lead paint, and developing programs to
educate residents about the dangers of lead paint.138 The court held that
the plaintiffs had no public nuisance claim because the defendants did
not exercise any control over the application of lead paint in buildings.139
Proximate causation in a public nuisance case, like in other tort cases,
is determined by “whether the injury is of a type that a reasonable person
would see as a likely result of his conduct.”140 Proximate causation
typically does not require that the nuisance actually injure or
inconvenience all members of the public so long as the nuisance injures
members “of the public who may come in contact with it.”141 In tort
actions, courts employ the “more likely than not” standard (as opposed to
the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard applicable to criminal actions)
to assess whether a defendant proximately caused a plaintiff’s injury.
136. See Corp. of Mercer Univ. v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., No. 85-126-3-MAC, 1986 WL
12447, at *6 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 9, 1986) (holding an asbestos manufacturer not responsible
for the nuisance of toxic asbestos-containing products placed in the plaintiff university’s
buildings because the manufacturer did not have the legal right to abate the nuisance);
see also Friends of the Sakonnet v. Dutra, 738 F. Supp. 623, 633–34 (D.R.I. 1990) (“The
paramount question is whether the defendant was in control of the instrumentality
alleged to have created the nuisance when the damage occurred.”).
137. 924 A.2d 484 (N.J. 2007).
138. Id. at 486–87.
139. See id. at 501–02, 505 (reasoning that “the presence of lead paint in buildings is
only a hazard if it is deteriorating, flaking, or otherwise disturbed . . . . Viewed in this
light . . . the Legislature, consistent with traditional public nuisance concepts, recognized
that the appropriate target of the abatement and enforcement scheme must be the
premises owner whose conduct has, effectively, created the nuisance”); see also City of
Manchester v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 637 F. Supp. 646, 656 (D.R.I. 1986) (holding that the
manufacturers of asbestos could not be liable in a public nuisance claim because they
had no control over their product after the plaintiff city bought it to use in public
buildings). But see In re StarLink Corn Prods. Liab. Litig., 212 F. Supp. 2d 828 (N.D. Ill.
2002) (rejecting a claim by the creator and manufacturer of genetically modified corn
seed that they could not be responsible for any nuisance caused by the pollen of their
genetically modified corn seed transferring and contaminating nearby farmers’ corn
because they were not in control of the seeds once other farmers bought them).
140. City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099, 1127 (Ill. 2004).
141. Dean v. State, 106 S.E. 792, 793 (Ga. 1921).
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In the context of a hypothetical antibiotic-resistance-related public
nuisance action, cases involving infectious diseases are instructive. In
Craten v. Foster Poultry Farms, Inc.,142 for example, the parents of an
infant killed by a salmonella infection sued Foster Poultry Farms, Inc.
(Foster Farms), as the source of the salmonella outbreak.143 The
company argued that the parents could not prove causation because
they did not know whether, in the week before his illness, their son had
eaten Foster Farms chicken specifically; because the son might have
eaten other brands of chicken; and because the son had eaten other
types of foods that also could have carried Salmonella.144 Despite this,
the jury found sufficient evidence showing causation based on two
expert reports that Foster Farms chicken more likely than not was the
source of the infant’s infection.145 The company appealed, and the
reviewing court found for the parents, noting that the plaintiffs did not
need to prove conclusively that the infant’s illness was caused by Foster
Farms chicken.146 Similarly, in Stinson v. State,147 an employee of
Washington State’s Department of Corrections acquired a MRSA
infection, which she alleged she obtained during her employment as a
ferry worker due to the State’s failure to maintain a safe ferry.148 In
reversing a grant of summary judgment, the court held that a
reasonable jury could find that the State more likely than not caused
the plaintiff’s infection.149

142. 305 F. Supp. 3d 1051 (D. Ariz. 2018).
143. Craten, 305 F. Supp. 3d at 1054.
144. Id. at 1061.
145. See id. at 1061–62 (listing the bases of the experts’ reports as “(1) the relatively
rare strain of Salmonella . . . contracted, (2) the fact that [the infant] contracted the
illness in Arizona, . . . the state with the second highest number of people affected by
the Foster Farms outbreak, (3) the fact that [the infant] became ill during the peak of
the outbreak, and (4) the fact that the [parents] claimed to have purchased and
consumed Foster Farms products in the past, even though they could not recall
whether they did so in the week leading up to [the infant’s] illness”).
146. See id. at 1062 (“[U]nder the preponderance of the evidence standard, the
[plaintiffs] need only convince a jury that it is more likely than not that Foster Farms
was the source . . . . [A] jury reasonably could draw that inference based on the
circumstantial evidence in the record and the opinions of the . . . expert witnesses.”).
147. No. 44004-1-II, 2014 WL 315134 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2014).
148. Id. at *1.
149. See id. at *6 (referencing circumstantial evidence like the State’s ban on use of
bleach and gloves on the ferries, the lack of running water or soap on the ferries, the
plaintiff’s involvement in a profession with much higher rates of MRSA than other
professions, and a medical expert’s testimony that the plaintiff “on a more probable
than not basis” was infected with MRSA while at work); see also Birke v. Oakwood
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In another negligence action involving infectious disease, Bussey v.
E.S.C. Restaurants, Inc.,150 a woman ate beef tips at a restaurant around
10:30 a.m. and later that day became ill, which resulted in her
hospitalization for four days.151 At trial, the woman testified about
when she had eaten the meat and about her symptoms, and a manager
at the restaurant testified that the woman had complained to him that
the meat smelled and tasted bad.152 In addition, the woman’s treating
physician testified that he diagnosed her with staphylococcal food
poisoning, based on “the history provided by [the woman], review of
her medical record from the emergency room, direct observation and
evaluation of her symptoms” as well as “lab testing that excluded other
causes of gastrointestinal distress.”153 The physician testified in
addition that “her symptoms could not have been caused by a casual
contact with bacteria such as having dirty hands.”154 Ultimately, the
court held that “the testimony of the plaintiff, indirect medical
evidence, and the reasonable inferences derived therefrom” sufficed
to establish proximate causation, despite “the lack of laboratory tests
showing the existence of staphylococcal bacteria.”155
C. Right-to-Farm Laws: Complications for State Nuisance Claims
Right-to-farm laws are typically thought to pose major obstacles to
nuisance claims under state law. All fifty states currently have right-tofarm statutes, which were created in the 1970s with the intention of
protecting family farms from nuisance lawsuits brought by the
inhabitants of neighboring properties bothered by, for example,
animal odors or contaminated water.156 Legislatures enacted right-tofarm laws to protect farms specifically from lawsuits by those who “came
Worldwide, 87 Cal. Rptr. 3d 602, 608 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (involving a similar causation
standard in a public nuisance case that considered whether the defendant’s conduct
was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s harm).
150. 620 S.E.2d 764 (Va. 2005).
151. Id. at 766.
152. Id. at 766–67.
153. Id. at 767.
154. Id.
155. See id. at 767–68 (noting that “[c]ases involving food poisoning present unique
circumstances because the primary source of evidence is usually consumed and
transmuted in the ordinary course of its use,” which means most food poisoning cases
“will necessarily rely upon circumstantial evidence”).
156. Carrie Hribar, Understanding Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations and Their
Impact on Communities, NAT’L ASS’N OF LOC. BOARDS OF HEALTH 11 (2010), https://www.
cdc.gov/nceh/ehs/docs/understanding_cafos_nalboh.pdf.
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to the nuisance,” (i.e., purchased or altered property after a nearby
nuisance had been established), which was then a growing concern
due to urban sprawl.157 Later on, in the 1990s, large industrial farms
became more prevalent, and the agribusiness lobby extracted even
stricter right-to-farm laws from legislatures.158
Nevertheless, right-to-farm laws do not provide impenetrable shields
to liability. Most statutes, for instance, explicitly state that negligent
conduct is not protected, and many include related provisions about
what management practices a farm must employ to benefit from the
right-to-farm law.159 For example, under Minnesota’s right-to-farm
statute, an agricultural operation is not a nuisance if, among other
requirements, it “operates according to generally accepted agricultural
practices.”160 Additionally, many right-to-farm statutes include an
exception that allows the state to protect against dangers to public

157. See Buchanan v. Simplot Feeders L.P., 952 P.2d 610, 612, 616 (Wash. 1998) (en
banc) (holding, after analyzing legislative intent, that the right-to-farm law’s
protection should be applied only when the nuisance arises because of urban
encroachment upon an agricultural area, and declaring that the right-to-farm
protections “should not be read to insulate agricultural enterprises from nuisance
actions brought by an agricultural or other rural plaintiff, especially if the plaintiff
occupied the land before the nuisance activity was established”). As an example of the
scenario from which legislatures wanted to protect farms, consider the prominent case
Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., wherein the court held that the owner of a
livestock feedlot predating a neighboring retirement community had to relocate after
his feedlot became a nuisance to the community, which had sprawled closer to it over
the years. See 494 P.2d 700, 701–05, 707–08 (Ariz. 1972) (en banc). Even though the
retirement community had “come to the nuisance,” that principle did not protect the
feedlot owner because it was necessary to protect public health. Id. at 706.
158. See Hribar, supra note 156, at 11; see also Vanessa Zboreak, “Yes, in Your Backyard!”
Model Legislative Efforts to Prevent Communities from Excluding CAFOs, 5 WAKE FOREST J.L. &
POL’Y 147, 149 (2015) (explaining that “a small number of massive agribusinesses . . . can
influence federal and state legislatures and regulatory agencies to make policies
promoting CAFOs and limiting restrictions on CAFO practices”). For an example of an
extremely restrictive right-to-farm law, see IOWA CODE §§ 352.1–352.12 (2017).
159. See Terence J. Centner, Governments and Unconstitutional Takings: When Do Rightto-Farm Laws Go Too Far?, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 87, 107 (2006) (explaining that states
use terms like “sound agricultural practices,” “generally accepted agricultural practices,”
and “best management practices” in their right-to-farm statutes).
160. MINN. STAT. § 561.19.2(a)(3) (2016).
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health,161 though the statutes in a minority of states create seemingly
comprehensive immunity to nuisance lawsuits.162
III. ANALYSIS
Subtherapeutic antibiotic use in livestock is a promising basis for
public nuisance claims brought by private citizens or state actors. By
fostering AMR, improper antibiotic use threatens public health, a
traditionally accepted right common to the public, as well as the
continued availability of effective antibiotics. Based on the deaths,
serious illnesses, and enormous economic burdens associated with
AMR, this interference is substantial and unreasonable. In addition,
enough studies associating AMR with farms exist to prove proximate
causation, which might also be easier in a parens patriae lawsuit. Finally,
right-to-farm laws do not completely bar all nuisance actions because
right-to-farm laws are premised upon property-based public nuisances,
not public-right-based public nuisances, which many statutes seem to
recognize by explicitly providing exceptions for threats to public health.
A. Improper Antibiotic Use Interferes with Public Health
Improper antibiotic use is a public nuisance because it threatens
public health. According to the Second Restatement, “[a] public
nuisance is an unreasonable interference with a right common to the
general public,” including “a significant interference with public
health.”163 Antibiotic misuse threatens a right common to the general
public in the truest sense of a threat to a right that is “collective in
nature.”164 Because bacteria are ubiquitous, the danger posed by AMR
is indiscriminate—no one can completely avoid exposure to bacteria
161. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 2-3202(a) (2016) (“Agricultural activities . . . are
presumed to be reasonable and do not constitute a nuisance, public or private, unless
the activity has a substantial adverse effect on the public health and safety.”); TEX. AGRIC.
CODE ANN. § 251.004(a) (2015) (“No nuisance action may be brought against an
agricultural operation that has lawfully been in operation for one year or more prior to
the date on which the action is brought . . . . This subsection does not restrict or impede
the authority of this state to protect the public health, safety, and welfare . . . .”).
162. E.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 413.072(2) (2010) (“No agricultural or silvicultural
operation . . . shall be or become a nuisance or trespass, private or public, . . . or be
subject to any ordinance that would restrict the right of the operator . . . to utilize
normal and accepted practices . . . when the operation was not a nuisance at the time
the operation began. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply whenever a
nuisance . . . results from the negligent operation.”).
163. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(1)–(2)(a) (AM. LAW. INST. 1979).
164. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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in the environment or transmission of bacteria among fellow humans.
For this same reason, medicine’s arsenal of effective antibiotics can be
considered an “indivisible resource shared by the public at large.”165
Although eager consumer advocates have failed to establish more
novel applications of the public nuisance doctrine, many of those
failed attempts addressed harmful products.166 Some believe that the
manufacture and distribution of products rarely violates a public right
because such manufacture and distribution usually entail merely a
conglomeration of separate violations of private rights, since products
are typically purchased and used by individual consumers.167
By contrast, a public nuisance action against improper antibiotic use
addresses a harmful practice.168 Practices posing some risk of infectious
disease have historically been bases of public nuisance claims.169
Indeed, improper antibiotic use is reminiscent of the traditional public
health threats in Seigle v. Bromley and Durand v. Dyson.170
The practice of using subtherapeutic levels of antibiotics is similar to
the hog farmer’s practice in Seigle v. Bromley of feeding his pigs garbage,
which the court found to be a public nuisance.171 Feeding garbage to
the pigs facilitated the formation and transfer of diseases like typhoid
fever, scarlet fever, and malaria, which was “inimical to the public
health.”172 Subtherapeutic antibiotic use in livestock likewise “tends
to . . . generate disease” because it allows bacteria to develop antibiotic

165. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
166. See supra note 56.
167. See Donald G. Gifford, Public Nuisance as a Mass Products Liability Tort, 71 U. CIN.
L. REV. 741, 816–17 (2003); see also supra note 53.
168. See, e.g., In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d 484, 501 (N.J. 2007) (rejecting the
plaintiffs’ attempt to hold lead paint manufacturers liable for creating a public
nuisance because “the Legislature, consistent with traditional public nuisance
concepts, recognized that the appropriate target of the abatement and enforcement
scheme must be the premises owner whose conduct [of poorly maintaining the
premises] has, effectively, created the nuisance”).
169. See e.g., Durand v. Dyson, 111 N.E. 143, 145–46 (Ill. 1915) (holding that cattle
with a dangerous, contagious disease were a public nuisance and that preventing
diseases from spreading is essential to public health); S.D. Dep’t of Health v. Owen,
350 N.W.2d 48, 51 (S.D. 1984) (stating that elk with bovine tuberculosis were a public
nuisance that might warrant destruction to protect public health).
170. See Seigle v. Bromley, 124 P. 191, 193 (Colo. App. 1912); Durand v. Dyson, 111
N.E. 143, 145–46 (Ill. 1915).
171. See 124 P. at 193.
172. Id.
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resistance at much faster rates than would occur naturally;173 these
resistant bacteria can then infect people with illnesses that,
consequently, are more difficult to treat.174 Further, one person
harboring resistant bacteria may transfer the bacteria to other humans,
leading to more illnesses.175 Thus, both feeding garbage to hogs and
improper administration of antibiotics to livestock are harmful
practices that facilitate the formation of serious, contagious bacterial
diseases. These diseases are also conveyed via similar mechanisms: through
contact with livestock; with contaminated meat; or with a vector (such as a
fly), which itself has somehow picked up the bacteria.176 Improper
antibiotic use therefore should similarly be considered an unreasonable
interference with public health that gives rise to a public nuisance.
B. Improper Antibiotic Use is an Unreasonable Interference
Subtherapeutic antibiotic use is a more substantial unreasonable
interference with public health than traditional contagious disease
threats. Not only does subtherapeutic antibiotic use proliferate illness,
but it also increases the virulence of various bacterial infections.177
Otherwise non-fatal and easily-treatable infections can become so
much more difficult to treat that they prove deadly. As more and more
bacteria become resistant to more and more antibiotics, health care
providers are forced to proceed down the line of effective antibiotics
until they reach the “last resort” antibiotics, and even these now do not

173. See Town of Nags Head v. Toloczko, No. 2:11-CV-1-D, 2014 WL 4219516, at *16
(E.D.N.C. Aug. 18, 2014) (“Whatever tends to endanger life, or generate disease, and
affects the health of the community . . . is generally, at common law, a public nuisance,
and a crime.” (citing State v. Everhardt, 166 S.E. 738, 742 (N.C. 1932))); see also
Silbergeld, et al., supra note 36, at 162 (“A consistent temporal relationship between
the introduction of antimicrobials into agricultural use and increases in the prevalence
of resistant organisms has been found in animals, animal-derived food products, and
humans . . . .”).
174. See supra notes 29–32, 38–42 and accompanying text.
175. See Chang et al., supra note 41, at 241 (“A human is infected or colonized with
a resistant microbe through any of these means, followed by ongoing transmission
among humans, with some of these humans becoming ill.”).
176. See Seigle, 124 P. at 193 (“[D]isease may be contracted from such garbage, such
as typhus and typhoid fever, scarlet fever, probably malaria fever. It may be carried
from these places by the house fly.”).
177. See supra notes 39–42 and accompanying text (explaining that bacteria
subjected to an antibiotic can transfer resistance genes to other bacteria).
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always work.178 Thus, subtherapeutic antibiotic use ultimately hastens
depletion of medicine’s arsenal of effective antibiotics.
AMR causes roughly 23,000 deaths annually, as compared to, for
example, the 12,979 homicides committed with guns.179 Considering
these statistics and the numerous government reports acknowledging
the public health threat of AMR, an antibiotic misuse public nuisance
claim would not face the same difficulty as the public nuisance claim
involving, for instance, genetically modified rice. The court in In re
Genetically Modified Rice Litigation180 rejected the public nuisance claim
because the plaintiffs could not prove genetically modified rice was
actually dangerous to public health, whereas ample scientific evidence
supports that antibiotic misuses threatens public health.181
Similarly, the threat posed by antibiotic misuse is significantly larger
than the threat posed by products containing minute amounts of trans
fats. As the court in the California case, Guttmann, reported, “[n]o
decision applying California law has found that interference with the
general public’s right to a safe food supply by selling products with
unhealthy ingredients constituted a public nuisance.”182 Though the
court did not elaborate much on its reasoning, it might also have been
concerned about the paternalism involved in an attempt to ban
unhealthy foods. A public nuisance claim regarding antibiotic overuse
would not raise the same concern: no person wants to acquire an
antibiotic-resistant infection, whereas some people do decide the
benefits of eating foods with trans fats outweigh the harms. There are
no benefits to an antibiotic-resistant infection.
Moreover, subtherapeutic use of antibiotics is not only unreasonable
because it artificially speeds the development of antibiotic-resistant bacteria,
endangering public health, but also because it does so unnecessarily.
Reasonable alternatives to using preventive, subtherapeutic amounts of
antibiotics exist and are currently being employed successfully. Although
it is economical for large producers to keep animals in poor conditions that

178. See CDC, supra note 5, at 22–23 (describing how, due to bacterial resistance,
certain pathogens are becoming resistant to nearly all drugs that would be considered
for treatment, namely carbapenems and polymyxins, presenting significant challenges
to healthcare professionals attempting to treat these infections in hospitals).
179. See CDC, supra note 5, at 6; CDC, Assault or Homicide, NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH
STATS., https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/homicide.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2018).
180
180.
666 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (E.D. Mo. 2009).
181. See id. at 1018.
182. No. C 15-00567 WHA, 2015 WL 4309427, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 15, 2015).
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foster disease and necessitate regular subtherapeutic use of antibiotics, the
public should not be forced to bear producers’ externalized costs.183
C. Enough Scientific Data Exist to Support Proximate Causation
Proof of proximate causation in a public nuisance action will be
similar to the proof required in other tort cases.184 A judge may assess
causation based on whether a reasonable person could foresee the
injury as a likely result of his conduct.185 In the past, plaintiffs might
have had difficulty establishing causation in an antibiotic misuse public
nuisance action, since the agriculture industry denied, essentially from
the conception of antibiotic use in livestock, that such use increases
resistance.186 Now, however, it is irrefutably clear that the use, and
especially the subtherapeutic use, of antibiotics causes antibiotic

183. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
184. See Whaley v. Park City Mun. Corp., 190 P.3d 1, 6 (Utah Ct. App. 2008) (stating
that private plaintiffs in public nuisance lawsuits “must establish additional elements
beyond those required to be proven by a public entity,” including that the defendants
“caused or are responsible for the nuisance”).
185. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
186. See Fact Sheet, American Meat Institute, Antibiotic Use in Livestock
Production: Ensuring Meat Safety, https://www.meatinstitute.org/index.php?ht=a/
GetDocumentAction/i/56994. The AMI provided a disingenuous and inaccurate
answer to the question of whether antibiotic use in livestock causes antibiotic resistance
in humans that states:
When antibiotics are used in livestock and poultry production, strict
withdrawal periods must be followed before the animals are processed for
foods . . . in the unlikely event that antibiotic residues are present, they do
not exceed the tolerance levels deemed unsafe by FDA and USDA . . . . Most
informed scientists and public health professionals acknowledge that the
problem of antibiotic resistance in humans is overwhelmingly an issue
related to human antibiotic use.
See id.
The American Veterinary Medical Association also provides that:
There are also some who say that antimicrobial resistance is caused by
widespread use of antimicrobials in food production systems. Their
argument is that the more antimicrobials are used in animals, the more we
expose the organisms to the antimicrobials and give them the opportunity to
develop resistance. Although that may be true in a very simplified, general
sense, the scientific evidence of how, if or to what extent such exposure
affects human health remains unclear . . . . [R]isk assessments have shown
that the use of antimicrobials in food production systems plays an extremely
small role [in causing AMR].
See Antimicrobial Use and Antimicrobial Resistance FAQ, AMERICAN VETERINARY MEDICAL
ASSOCIATION, https://www.avma.org/KB/Resources/FAQs/Pages/Antimicrobial-Use
-and-Antimicrobial-Resistance-FAQs.aspx (last visited Oct. 17, 2018).
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resistance.187 In fact, this relationship has been evident for quite a long
time, going all the way back (at least) to 1945.188 That year, Alexander
Fleming, the inventor of the first antibiotic, penicillin, specifically told
his audience he wanted to “sound one note of warning,” and explained:
It is not difficult to make microbes resistant to penicillin in the
laboratory by exposing them to concentrations not sufficient to kill
them, and the same thing has occasionally happened in the
body . . . . [T]here is the danger that the ignorant man may easily
underdose himself and by exposing his microbes to non-lethal
quantities of the drug make them resistant. Here is a hypothetical
illustration. Mr. X has a sore throat. He buys some penicillin and
gives himself, not enough to kill the streptococci but enough to
educate them to resist penicillin. He then infects his wife. Mrs. X
gets pneumonia and is treated with penicillin. As the streptococci
are now resistant to penicillin the treatment fails. Mrs. X dies. Who
is primarily responsible for Mrs. X’s death? Why Mr. X whose negligent use
of penicillin changed the nature of the microbe.189

It is worth noting that Fleming himself assigned responsibility to Mr. X,
whose improper use of penicillin caused Mrs. X to die.
Craten is helpful in illustrating how a plaintiff in a public nuisance
action might establish causation because it involved a food-borne
illness.190 Usually, it is difficult to identify precisely where an infection
came from because humans are presented with many sources of bacteria
on a daily basis.191 As a result, the plaintiff usually must rely on
187. See PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, FOOD ANIMAL PRODUCTION AND ANTIBIOTIC
RESISTANCE: THE SOLUTION (2012), http://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/legacy/
uploadedfiles/phg/supporting_items/ibsaveantibioticsthesolutionpdf.pdf (citing to
172 studies on “how antibiotic use in food animal production contributes to the
growing health crisis of antibiotic resistance” as evidence of the scientific consensus).
188. See Alexander Fleming, Nobel Lecture: Penicillin 92–93 (Dec. 11, 1945),
https://assets.nobelprize.org/uploads/2018/06/fleming-lecture.pdf.
In fact, a
recent study found that just one year after mass production of ampicillin (the antibiotic
developed after penicillin) began in 1961, the first outbreak of Salmonella resistant to
ampicillin occurred because farmers had been putting subtherapeutic penicillin in
their livestock feed. See Alicia Tran-Dien et al., Early Transmissible Ampicillin Resistance
in Zoonotic Salmonella enterica Serotype Typhimurium in the Late 1950s: A Retrospective,
Whole-Genome Sequencing Study, 18 LANCET INFECTIOUS DISEASES 207, 207–08 (2018).
189. See id. (emphasis added).
190. See 305 F. Supp. 3d 1051, 1053 (D. Ariz. 2018) (involving an infant who died
from Salmonella).
191. Robert R. Dunn et al., Home Life: Factors Structuring the Bacterial Diversity Found
Within and Between Homes, 8 PLOS ONE 1, 1–2 (May 2013) (describing the
predominance of “house-associated microbial communities [which] are ubiquitous
and diverse” and include “many hundreds or even thousands” of different types of
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circumstantial evidence.192 For example, a person who works on a farm
that administers subtherapeutic antibiotics to its livestock and acquires an
antibiotic-resistant infection could likely offer testimony about his
presence at the farm as circumstantial evidence for proving proximate
causation, just as, in Bussey v. E.S.C. Restaurants, Inc., the woman’s
testimony about eating beef tips in a restaurant before later experiencing
food poisoning symptoms was admissible to prove proximate causation.193
The causation with respect to improper antibiotic use is similar to
the causation in In re StarLink Corn Products Liability Litigation.194 In that
case, the defendants disseminated a genetically-modified strain of corn
seed, which contaminated other farmers’ corn through pollen
transfer.195 Though the defendants tried to argue they could not be
responsible for any nuisance because they were not in control of the
seeds once other farmers planted them, the court found that the
defendants had caused the nuisance.196 Especially because the
plaintiffs never had any ability to control the nuisance, the court
refused to absolve the defendants of responsibility as the source of the
corn.197 Likewise, a farmer who uses subtherapeutic levels of
antibiotics cannot argue that he is not responsible for the transfer of
antibiotic-resistant bacteria because the improper use occurs on his
property where he can exercise control.
Unlike many of the modern harms that attorneys have attempted to
address using novel applications of public nuisance theory, improper
antibiotic use will not suffer from the same difficulty of proving the
defendants had control over the nuisance-producing conduct. Many
academics have criticized, and many courts have rejected, cases
attempting to use public nuisance theory to address topics such as
climate change, lead paint, handguns, tobacco use, environmental
pollution, and, most recently, opiates.198 The party analogous to the
bacteria that “vary across the wide range of surfaces found within homes,” not to
mention the bacteria that people encounter outside their homes).
192. See Craten, 305 F. Supp. 3d at 1061–62 (pointing to evidence like expert
testimony and epidemiological information as establishing causation).
193. See supra notes 150–155 and accompanying text.
194
212 F. Supp. 2d 828 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
195. See id. at 844–45.
196. See id. at 845, 847.
197. Id. at 846–47.
198. See, e.g., Joseph W. Cleary, Comment, Municipalities Versus Gun Manufacturers:
Why Public Nuisance Claims Just Do Not Work, 31 U. BALT. L. REV. 273, 302–03 (2002)
(criticizing any possible judicial acceptance of public nuisance actions against gun
manufacturers as “judicial activism [that] may be costly in its own right to the stability
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lead paint manufacturers in a public nuisance claim concerning
improper antibiotic use would be the pharmaceutical companies who
manufacture antibiotics; even if the companies knew their antibiotics
could potentially be used in dangerous ways, they would not necessarily
have control over how veterinarians prescribed or how farmers used
their products. To avoid this issue, the proper defendant would be the
farmer who administers antibiotics at a subtherapeutic level. It is also
possible that veterinarians who prescribe antibiotics for use at a
subtherapeutic level, or who reasonably should know that the antibiotics they
are prescribing will be used at a subtherapeutic level, could be defendants.
D. Both Private and Public Plaintiffs Could Bring an Antibiotic Misuse
Public Nuisance Action
Two types of plaintiffs could bring a public nuisance action to enjoin
subtherapeutic antibiotic use or perhaps to recover damages: private
citizens and a state official as parens patriae. While an action brought
by the state typically has a less burdensome causation requirement, the
possibility of private citizens bringing public nuisance claims offers an
additional opportunity to address antibiotic resistance.
One with “authority as a public official or public agency to represent
the state or a political subdivision” may bring a lawsuit to enjoin a
public nuisance.199 This category includes parens patriae lawsuits
brought by a state’s attorney general.200 A parens patriae lawsuit is likely
preferable to a public nuisance lawsuit brought by a private citizen
because a government actor probably will not have to trace a particular
individual’s infection to a particular farm.201 In order to argue that the
state has standing, the attorney general could rely on the increased
costs of state-funded medical care for residents with resistant
of the entire legal system,” which would result in the tort of public nuisance “hav[ing]
such limitless dimensions that it would cease to have any meaningful legal
significance”); Donald G. Gifford, Impersonating the Legislature: State Attorneys General
and Parens Patriae Product Litigation, 49 B.C. L. REV. 913, 913 (2008) (arguing that
attorneys general suing on behalf of their states for product-related diseases “seek to
supplant the regulatory regimes previously enacted by Congress, the state legislature,
or federal agencies with one that reflects their own visions” and have a “symbiotic
relationship” with “a small number of plaintiffs’ law firms [which] distorts both
governmental priorities and fiscal policy”).
199. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C(2)(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
200. See, e.g., Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901) (involving a parens patriae
lawsuit on behalf of Missouri to stop Chicago from devising a sewer system that would
carry sewage to the Mississippi River and into Missouri).
201. See Wiley, supra note 57, at 231–32 n.95, 236–37.
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infections, which are much more directly related to the alleged
nuisance than, for example, the increased police costs from the illegal
use of guns were related to manufacturers simply manufacturing guns
in Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp.202 More importantly, the type of
public right involved in antibiotics cases would not amount to a “mere
aggregation of interests”—the accusation often asserted against public
nuisance actions resembling products liability ones. Instead, actions
that decrease the continued availability of effective antibiotics
constitute an “interference with the interests of the community at
large.”203 In addition, antibiotic misuse has “a continuing inherent or
natural tendency to create danger and inflict injury.”204
Furthermore, the attorney general would be able to articulate a
“quasi-sovereign interest.”205 A quasi-sovereign interest includes a public
right that involves “an indivisible resource shared by the public at large,
like air, water, or public rights of way.”206 Arguably, continued
availability of antibiotics to the public is such an “indivisible resource,”
or what is sometimes referred to as a “public good.” Because the misuse
of antibiotics affects the public indiscriminately, by generally increasing
the levels of antibiotic-resistant bacteria, it is similar to an “indivisible
resource,” like air, which affects the public indiscriminately if polluted.
Antibiotic misuse is a negative externality because livestock farms
improperly use antibiotics to increase their profits, without accounting
for the costs to the public resulting from the proliferation of antibioticresistant bacteria.
Alternatively, a private citizen could bring a public nuisance lawsuit
if she has “suffered harm of a kind different from that suffered by other
members of the public exercising the right common to the general
public that was the subject of interference.”207 According to the court

202. See Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 780 A.2d 98, 118 (Conn. 2001) (dismissing
a public nuisance claim against gun manufacturers as the court was not convinced by
the plaintiffs’ allegation that “[a]s a result of the defendants’ conduct, [the Plaintiff
city] has incurred increased expenses for police services, including courts, prisons and
related services, emergency services . . . [, which] has been required to impose related
increased tax burdens on [the city’s] taxpayers”).
203. In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d 484, 495 (N.J. 2007) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. b).
204. Ganim, 780 A.2d at 131 (quoting Carabetta v. City of Meriden, 142 A.2d 727,
728 (Conn. 1958)).
205. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 538 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
206. City of Chicago v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 823 N.E.2d 126, 131 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
207. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C(1).
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in a 2009 California case, Birke v. Oakwood Worldwide,208 an injury “to
the health and comfort of an individual, is in its nature special and
peculiar and does not cause a damage which can properly be said to
be common or public.”209 Accordingly, an obvious example of a private
citizen who could bring a public nuisance lawsuit would be a farm
worker who developed an antibiotic-resistant infection, since actually
contracting an antibiotic-resistant infection is a harm more severe than
the general public’s increased risk of exposure to antibiotic-resistant
bacteria as a result of the defendant’s practices. Theoretically, though
causation might be more difficult to prove, any person involved in a
farm-to-consumer supply chain could contract an antibiotic-resistant
illness and associate it with a farm’s antibiotic practices. In addition,
since people who live close to farms are more likely to acquire
antibiotic-resistant infections, they might be well situated to bring
public nuisance claims.210
While there are no extant public nuisance cases dealing with
antibiotics, other types of actions involving infections suggest
individuals could bring successful antibiotics-related public nuisance
actions. For example, in Dega Poultry Co.,211 a veterinarian successfully
proved in a workers’ compensation proceeding that his Salmonella
infection was contracted during his employment by a poultry
company.212 The veterinarian had inspected the company’s chickens
for disease, and he believed that he had contracted salmonella from
one of the company’s flocks because the sick chickens had some of the
same symptoms that he had.213 The poultry company and its insurance
company argued that there was “no substantial proof that [the
veterinarian’s] salmonellosis arose out of his employment.”214

208. 87 Cal. Rptr. 3d 602 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009).
209. See id. at 610–11 (holding that the plaintiff could successfully allege special injury in a
case about a second-hand smoke nuisance because his childhood asthma was aggravated, which
was a special injury as compared to the general public’s increased risk of lung cancer).
210. Several studies have analyzed the high incidence of MRSA infection among pig
farmers. See, e.g., Casey et al., supra note 34, at 1981 (mentioning several studies,
including some analyzing pig farming families, that found that living or working on a
farm was a risk factor for MRSA infection); Tara C. Smith et al., Methicillin-Resistant
Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) Strain ST398 Is Present in Midwestern U.S. Swine and Swine
Workers, 4 PLOS ONE 1, 1, 3 (Jan. 2009) (finding that forty-nine percent of swine workers
were colonized with MRSA, which is thirty times the national average infection).
211. 533 S.W.2d 207 (Ark. 1976).
212. Id. at 208–09.
213. Id. at 209.
214. Id.
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However, the court disagreed, calling the evidence “one-sided” in favor
of the veterinarian and explaining, “If the claimant’s disability arises
soon after the accident and is logically attributable to it, with nothing
to suggest any other explanation for the employee’s condition, we may
say without hesitation that there is no substantial evidence to sustain
the commission’s refusal to make an award.”215 Ultimately, the court
concluded that there was a “strong probability” that the veterinarian
was infected by the company’s flock and dismissed the notion that a
claimant “must prove the source of an infection with absolute
certainty” as “a manifest impossibility.”216 As long as a plaintiff bringing
a public nuisance lawsuit with a special injury of an antibiotic-resistant
infection encountered a court with a similar willingness to accept
reasonably persuasive circumstantial evidence, the action could succeed.
E. Right-to-Farm Laws Are Not Insurmountable
Right-to-farm laws should not bar public nuisance actions regarding
antibiotic misuse. A public nuisance claim relating to improper
antibiotic use would not resemble the type of nuisance lawsuits that
legislatures attempted to abate with right-to-farm laws.217 This is mainly
because the “coming to the nuisance” theory is tied to the plaintiff
owning physical property close enough to the defendant to be
subjected to the nuisance.218
A public nuisance action to enjoin subtherapeutic use of antibiotics
in livestock would instead allege an unreasonable interference with a
public right. This type of action does not require the plaintiff to own

215. Id. (quoting Hall v. Pittman Constr. Co., 357 S.W.2d 263, 264 (Ark. 1962)).
216. See id. (listing the evidence that the court considered substantial: a physician who
had treated the veterinarian testified that “salmonella paratyphoid is a rare disease” that “is
found in the digestive tract of human beings, chickens, and other creatures”; the
veterinarian stripped out the intestines of chickens when “performing post mortem
examinations for disease”; the treating physician “testified positively that [the veterinarian]
had the disease” and thought it was likely contracted by working with the infected chickens;
a different veterinarian “testified that poultry products are a common source of
salmonellosis”; and the veterinarian had handled only the poultry company’s birds).
217. See Buchanan v. Simplot Feeders Ltd. P’ship, 952 P.2d 610, 614–16 (Wash.
1998) (en banc) (holding, after analyzing legislative intent, that the right-to-farm law’s
protection should be applied only when the nuisance arises because of urban
encroachment upon an agricultural area, and declaring that the right-to-farm
protections “should not be read to insulate agricultural enterprises from nuisance
actions brought by an agricultural or other rural plaintiff, especially if the plaintiff
occupied the land before the nuisance activity was established”).
218. Id. at 615.
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any property; instead, the lawsuit aims to enjoin a harm that is
dispersed, which would exist regardless of where the farm is located
because of the nature of microbial transfer. Since the premise of rightto-farm laws—the notion of coming-to-the-nuisance—addresses
property-based nuisances, logically, right-to-farm laws should not apply
to public-right-based nuisance actions. Perhaps in recognition of this,
some states’ right-to-farm statutes contain exceptions for potential
harms to public health. If a plaintiff can prove that subtherapeutic
antibiotic use is an unreasonable interference with public health in the
first place, the plaintiff can take advantage of this exception in the
right-to-farm law. Since the World Health Organization and the CDC
(along with many other groups) have both identified antibiotic
resistance as a threat to public health, it might not be very difficult to
exploit public health exceptions in right-to-farm laws.219
CONCLUSION
Over the past few decades, large industries have unrelentingly
harmed and taken advantage of Americans while simultaneously
denying any wrongdoing.
The tobacco industry’s prolonged
deception about cigarettes’ health risks and addictiveness is one
infamous example of this unfortunate phenomenon; another is the oil
and gas industry’s stubborn refusal to acknowledge the existence of
man-made climate change. Undoubtedly, countless more instances of
similar misconduct lurk below the public awareness. The agriculture
industry’s persistent refusal to admit that the subtherapeutic use of
antibiotics in farm animals fosters AMR is yet more duplicity
maintained for too long. As climate change has helped us realize,
eventually there comes a time when so much surreptitious misconduct
has slipped by unaddressed that the damage is irreparable. Since
industry capture too often strangles legislatures and regulatory agencies,
the courts ought to assume a role more protective of the populace.
Antibiotics are vital for modern medicine. Unfortunately, though,
antibiotic resistance is already a major health crisis, and it is ever
increasing. Despite this, the U.S. government continues to fail to
adequately address antibiotic misuse. Public nuisance lawsuits can
provide a novel approach for combating the improper use of antibiotics
in livestock. Improper subtherapeutic antibiotic use is a threat to public
health because it increases the risk and incidence of antibiotic-resistant

219. See supra notes 25, 27 and accompanying text.
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infection and threatens continued availability of effective antibiotics.
The relationship between subtherapeutic antibiotic use and increased
AMR is now undeniable, and viable alternatives exist for producers to
keep their livestock healthy. Although state right-to-farm laws might
complicate public nuisance lawsuits, they are by no means insurmountable.
After all, “public nuisance law, like common law generally, adapts to
changing scientific and factual circumstances.”220

220. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 423 (2011).

